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Recent theoretical, methodological, and technological advances in
the spatial sciences create an opportunity for social scientists to
address questions about the reciprocal relationship between con-
text (spatial organization, environment, etc.) and individual be-
havior. This emerging research community has yet to adequately
address the new threats to the confidentiality of respondent data
in spatially explicit social survey or census data files, however. This
paper presents four sometimes conflicting principles for the con-
duct of ethical and high-quality science using such data: protection
of confidentiality, the social–spatial linkage, data sharing, and data
preservation. The conflict among these four principles is particu-
larly evident in the display of spatially explicit data through maps
combined with the sharing of tabular data files. This paper reviews
these two research activities and shows how current practices
favor one of the principles over the others and do not satisfactorily
resolve the conflict among them. Maps are indispensable for the
display of results but also reveal information on the location of
respondents and sampling clusters that can then be used in
combination with shared data files to identify respondents. The
current practice of sharing modified or incomplete data sets or
using data enclaves is not ideal for either the advancement of
science or the protection of confidentiality. Further basic research
and open debate are needed to advance both understanding of
and solutions to this dilemma.
data preservation  data sharing  disclosure risk  social surveys 
spatial social science
Considering individuals in their spatial contexts opens a richarray of analytic possibilities. Geographers have traditionally
considered the spatial organization of populations and their
characteristics. Other social scientists have focused on the
importance of social location (defined by age, race, gender,
education, position in social networks, etc.) for actions of
individuals and families, with little attention to the importance
of spatial location and spatial relationships. The increasing
integration of these two lines of inquiry is made possible by
methodological advances in the spatial sciences and data col-
lection advances in the social sciences. As a result, spatially
explicit data sets that contain information on the attitudes and
behaviors of individuals and households are now being created
that permit researchers to address important scientific questions
that have heretofore resisted methodologically defensible em-
pirical analysis.
Although the creation of these new data sets is good news for
the spatial and social scientific communities, their exploitation
to further our understanding of the causes and consequences of
human behavior is currently being hampered by uncertainty
about the effects of the availability of such spatially explicit data
on the risk of causing harm to respondents through confidenti-
ality breaches. This uncertainty is leading to the underutilization
of data and is increasing the possibility that well intentioned
scientists could inadvertently disclose information that could
harm respondents. Because of this uncertainty, we begin this
paper with four principles that must guide the collection, anal-
ysis, publication, distribution, and archiving of spatially explicit,
micro-, social science data, showing how, in combination, they
can stand in opposition to one another. We do so in the belief
that before a problem can be solved, it needs to be understood.
In our view, the combination of spatially explicit displays of data
and the sharing of data across research teams creates a new
problem that is insoluble with accepted practices in geography or
other social sciences. We thus provide more detail on these two
issues after discussing the four principles.
The Principles and the Problem
Protection of Confidentiality. Ensuring the confidentiality of in-
formation collected about individual human research subjects is
fundamental to the ethical conduct of research. Information
that, if known, might lead to physical, emotional, financial, or
other harm must not be able to be linked to individuals or
households [see, for example, the codes of conduct for the
Association of American Geographers (1), the American Psy-
chological Association (2), the American Political Science As-
sociation (3), and the American Sociological Association (4)]. In
following this principle, researchers are representatives of the
larger scientific community. The promise of confidentiality of
responses is not a bargain between the individual researcher and
respondent, nor is it only for the duration of the research project.
Ensuring actual and perceived confidentiality of scientific data
is necessary to guarantee the continued participation of the
public in censuses and social surveys. Individual researchers
must be concerned with the protection of confidentiality at all
stages and in all types of research, including when they collect,
disseminate, use, and read about data.
The Social–Spatial Linkage. The social–spatial linkage is the key to
the advancement of science in a variety of fields. By linking the
characteristics and actions of individuals, households, or com-
munities to a point in geographical space, researchers can
conduct a wealth of analyses about spatial pattern, process, and
the importance of relative location for respondent behaviors. For
the most rapid advancement of science, this linkage must be
available to researchers outside of the original data collection
team. In contrast to names or Social Security numbers, the
traditional personal identifiers in social survey data that would
allow linkage across a variety of data sources, location and the
information that it provides about relative position are impor-
tant inputs into statistical models. Although one would never
argue that knowing names was essential for analyzing the
relationship between alphabetical position and behavior, one
can easily argue that geographic location is essential for under-
standing the diffusion of behaviors.
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Data Sharing. Data sharing is essential on both scientific and
financial grounds. Replication is essential for the advancement
of science. For other research teams to be able to replicate,
falsify, or modify key research findings, data must be shared with
the larger research community. Spatial location is a key attribute
of social survey or census respondents that, when made available,
allows other researchers to conduct their own analyses and to
link new data to existing data. This necessity is recognized by
funding agencies, which now mandate the sharing of data
collected using their funding. The highest-quality data embody
a great deal of money and time that should not benefit only the
research team who collected them.
Data Preservation. Similarly, the preservation of data in its most
usable format, including the spatial location and other attributes of
respondents, for future generations of scientists is key to the
advancement of science. Although sometimes carried out by the
same organizations, preservation and data sharing remain funda-
mentally different activities. It is possible to think of a long-term
preservation strategy that postpones the sharing of information for
several generations (as is the case under the U.S. law that guards
original census records for 72 years after their creation), and it is
possible to think of a data-sharing strategy that exists for the
duration of a project’s active life (while it has funding, for example)
yet makes no long-term plans for preservation.
The Problem. Whether through the publication of data (including
maps) or the direct transfer of data files, the dissemination of
data to other researchers poses confidentiality protection prob-
lems for spatially explicit social survey or census data. Consider
a simple example: Imagine social survey data collected on
health-related work absences, which a research team used in the
absence of any environmental data. If the data set contained the
spatial location of work settings (e.g., respondent no. 72118
works at 35.9123°N, 79.0569°W), other researchers could easily
use such information to add data on air pollution, average
number of cloudy days, or elevation for their own analysis. If the
original data were disseminated with work location to facilitate
such analyses, respondent no. 72118 could be identified by
locating her workplace with a handheld global positioning system
(GPS) and then comparing the characteristics of employees at
that location with other data on respondent no. 72118 in the
public data file. Although this example is intuitively clear, it is
important to remember that there are relatively few simple cases
or simple solutions. Disclosure risk associated with display or
dissemination of spatially explicit social survey or census data
depends on the geographic coverage of the data, whether and
how geographic units are sampled, whether and how individuals
are sampled within those units, and the heterogeneity of indi-
viduals and sample clusters.
The following sections of this paper deal in more detail with
issues related to the graphic display of locations of respondents
or sample clusters and to the public release of data. We argue
that this combination of data display and data sharing increases
the possibility that the sharing of data will conflict with confi-
dentiality promises. It is obvious that researchers’ promises of
confidentiality require that the exact location of respondents
must be excluded from publicly released data. However, it also
is important that researchers realize that even indirect identifi-
cation of respondents or sampling clusters must be avoided. For
example, it is tempting to publicly thank institutions that con-
stitute sampling clusters for their cooperation in a web site or
press release, but such release of information is potentially
dangerous and should be avoided. It is similarly tempting to
provide a map showing (even in general terms) the distribution
of respondents or sample clusters, potentially with some inter-
esting but nonsensitive information. The difficulty arises when
that nonsensitive information or distribution is combined with
information contained in the public-use data file (see discussion
of Fig. 1 below).
In recent years, a small number of data producers and data
archives, including the U.S. Census Bureau, have attempted
simultaneously to share data and limit the risk of disclosure by
restricting the data to use within a secure workplace, sometimes
called an ‘‘enclave’’ or a ‘‘cold room.’’ These facilities give
carefully selected researchers who are able to travel to their
location limited access to data; these facilities also control and
delay the removal of research results from the premises and
require that researchers pay a substantial daily or monthly fee for
access. Most observers of these facilities report that, although
they permit research to be completed, they are costly for both the
operator and the data user, and because of their cost and the
temptation for data holders to enclose more and more data, they
reduce the extent to which data are used for the most sophisti-
cated forms of analysis. Some of these facilities are hardly used
at all as a result, and even the most frequently used are not used
to capacity. Although they are an important solution to the
problem and one that we support, restricted data enclaves need
to be improved substantially before they can be considered
successful.
The amount of information about location that may ever be
made public in any form (e.g., in maps that are part of papers and
presentations) is still something that the research community
must conclusively work out. Although standards exist for the
presentation of purely geographical data (5, 6) and separately for
the presentation of tabular data (7), no standards exist for the
presentation of maps based on extensive tabular data. Similarly,
we have not begun to estimate disclosure risk from combinations
of map data and tabular data. We begin this conversation in this
paper by considering the identification of sample clusters in a
map and by considering in more depth the options for dissem-
ination of data with social–spatial linkages.
Display and Visualization
Maps and displays based on spatially referenced social survey
data have great potential to inform the research process and
communicate complex results. At the same time, display and
visualization can threaten confidentiality, and it is incumbent on
researchers to minimize disclosure risks. The risk of disclosure
varies from project to project, and there are currently no
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of residences of hypothetical survey respondents
in Washtenaw County, Michigan, with attributes of one respondent.
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accepted methods for estimating disclosure risk or standards for
minimizing disclosure risk in the display of maps. This section
provides an example for assessing such risk for one project.
Presenting information cartographically is a very useful tool,
one that more and more researchers use. At the same time,
disclosure risks are associated with cartographic data presenta-
tion. Among these risks is the long-term harm that may come
from the publication of maps that indicate, even in general terms,
the location of an individual who is included in a linked (or
potentially linked) social science research database. No respon-
sible researcher would publish the name or other precise iden-
tifier, such as an exact address, of a research subject in a journal,
web-based publication, or handouts at a public presentation.
They might, however, publish other information that they
thought was innocuous, e.g., the mapped location of individuals
with certain kinds of responses, or publicly available natural
information about a place where the subject lived or worked. Fig.
1 shows a simple example of the sort of risks accompanying maps.
Fig. 1 is a map of Washtenaw County, Michigan, overlaid with
a hypothetical set of locational points indicating respondent
residences. The figure shows some attributes of a respondent.
Although seemingly harmless, these data could be linked with
public-release survey data that have no locational information to
find out other, potentially more compromising, information
about the respondent. The published map (Fig. 1) only shows
age, sex, race, and distance to work. But suppose the article also
provides a link to a publicly available data set. If the data set is
a random sample of the adult population of the United States,
knowing that the person is male narrows the search for the
respondent to about half the cases in the data set. Further,
knowing that the person is black, over 50 years old, and lives in
the Midwest would narrow the search for the respondent to one
or at most a handful of cases in the data set.
Further, consider the disclosure risks associated with putting
a visual display of a clustered sample design in a publication
or presentation. We present examples drawn from the National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), which
involved surveys administered to 20,000 adolescents at three
time points, to consider possible rules for the display of spatial
data that limit disclosure risk. One of the motivations for Add
Health was to examine how social contexts such as families,
friends, peers, schools, neighborhoods, and communities in-
f luence adolescents’ health and risk behaviors. Thus, the
survey implemented a school-based sample design in which
schools served as clusters in the first stage of sample selection,
and then students were sampled from these schools in the
second stage. The clustered sample design increases disclosure
risks, and visual display adds to these risks because it may
reveal clues about the identity of the clusters as well as about
the respondents themselves.
In considering rules for the display of spatial data, we first
must specify a level of disclosure risk that can be tolerated.
Disclosure risks are twofold: (i) those that are associated with
identification of the cluster and (ii) those that are associated with
identification of respondents given a known cluster. To keep
things simple, we restrict our attention to the first, the risk of
identifying a cluster, and specify a median probability of iden-
tification of 0.05 as the risk level that we can tolerate in a visual
display. A 0.05 risk level is for illustrative purposes only. In
practice, we expect that most researchers and their institutional
review boards would set this tolerance level much lower.
Add Health is but one of a large number of studies that use a
sampling design that begins with selecting schools. To illustrate
our point about cluster designs, we simulate a sampling frame of
public schools containing an eleventh grade by using information
from the National Center for Education Statistics (http:
nces.ed.govccdaddress.asp). These data have the geographic
location of each public school in the continental United States
in 2000 containing an eleventh grade. We can assume that a
potential intruder also has access to these publicly available data.
The question then is how to design a display to achieve an
average of a 1-in-20 chance of identifying a given school. As
mentioned, this risk is only one part of that associated with the
risks of disclosing respondent identities. The chances of identi-
fying a respondent will be considerably less than 1 in 20, with the
actual likelihood depending on the characteristics of the respon-
dent and cluster (relative to the characteristics of the populations
of respondents and clusters) as well as sampling (if any) within
the cluster.
Given a disclosure risk level of 0.05 or lower and given
information about the locations and spatial distributions of
schools, map symbols can be designed so that a point indicating
the location of a specific school could be associated with any of
20 schools. There are 13,126 schools in all. For each school, the
size of the buffer that would contain 19 other schools was
determined. The median size of the buffer is 20.5 kilometers
(km). This median indicates that, at least half the time, a circle
having a radius of 20.5 km drawn around a specific school will
contain 20 schools. The points or dots indicating school
location could be set to this size. Fig. 2A shows the location of
an arbitrarily selected school in the Central Atlantic region with
a point or dot corresponding to a 20-km buffer. If a 0.05 level of
disclosure risk could be tolerated for the median school, then
location of a sample school could be shown at this scale of
Fig. 2. Point location of school in hypothetical public release data file. (A) Without state boundaries displayed. (B) With state boundaries displayed.


















presentation. Clearly, if the level of disclosure risk were set more
stringently, say at 0.01, then the size of the buffer would be
considerably larger.
Threats to data security at a given scale also will depend on
what else can be inferred about the school. Fig. 2 A does not show
state boundaries. If state boundaries or other additional themes
were included in the map, disclosure risks would increase. Fig.
2B adds state boundaries. Looking at this map, given the buffer’s
location toward the southern end of the boundary between
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, one would likely guess (correctly)
that the selected school is located in Philadelphia. The general
point is that layers or themes potentially displayable on a map
add to the security threat.
Threats to data security also depend on heterogeneity in the
spatial distribution of the sample clusters. Schools are not evenly
spread over the map of the United States. The density of schools
is much higher in large cities than rural areas, for example. In the
case of our example, knowing or guessing that the school selected
for illustrative purposes is in Philadelphia actually tells us less
than it might appear. Again using a 0.05 level of disclosure risk,
for schools in large cities such as Philadelphia, we need only a
5.8-km buffer on average, much less than the 20-km buffer
incorporated in Fig. 2. Putting it another way, given that the
school of interest is in Philadelphia, the 20-km buffer in Fig. 2
includes many more than 19 other schools. In fact, for schools in
large cities such as Philadelphia, the use of a 20-km buffer in
these maps is equivalent to a disclosure risk level of 0.01, not
0.05.
However, the problem is the reverse in rural areas, where
schools and respondents are widely dispersed. A buffer of 20 km
is insufficient. We would need a buffer of 51.2 km to achieve no
more than a 0.05 level of disclosure risk in the median case.
Further, it might be possible to infer from a map that the selected
school is likely in a rural area. Even if state boundaries were not
shown, it might be possible to guess from position on a conti-
nental map that a school was located in, for example, South
Dakota, a heavily rural region of the country. If clusters are
randomly distributed, then other than their general location, no
additional information will be revealed in a map. If there are
regional or rural–urban patterns or other systematic patterns in
the spatial distribution of the clusters, however, additional care
must be taken.
This example has been based on Add Health, a data set that
contains very sensitive data on sexual and other behaviors. It is
unlikely that the identities and locations for their sample schools
will ever be released. Nevertheless, our examination of disclo-
sure risk in visual displays related to this data set illustrates
important points associated with visual display of any spatially
referenced survey data set based on a multistage clustered
design. The risk associated with any given display depends on the
scale of presentation and the various layers displayed. It also
depends on the available public-use data, both whether the data
are available and what variables are included. It also is important
to note that, before we did the actual analysis, we did not know
what could be reasonably displayed in a publication, presenta-
tion, or on a web site. The general conclusion of this exercise is
that, as our capabilities for linking geographic data with survey
data improve, we also need to better understand the risks that
are being created for disclosure of the identities of respondents,
and this type of research is just beginning. We are still learning
what we do not know.
Protecting Location Information in Data That Are Archived
and Shared
Many social scientists have made a practice of both long-term
data preservation and sharing their data with others for second-
ary analysis. In recent years, these practices have been encour-
aged by the policies of governmental and nongovernmental
research funders.** It is because of this practice of sharing and
preserving data that we see risk that goes beyond a map showing
confidential information at the exact location of respondents.
Introducing the notion of data preservation and sharing into the
confidentiality protection equation adds the role of the data
archivist (and the funding agencies who often mandate data
sharing) to the list of actors who are involved and highlights the
rewards and risks that flow from collecting, sharing, and making
use of these data. We count as data archivists those whose
primary organizational responsibility falls in that area as well as
those who lead and manage research centers where data collec-
tion and data sharing are undertaken, even if they do not
normally think of themselves as archivists.
The data archivist shares with the original producer of the data
the responsibility for making the data available to secondary
users without compromising the promise of privacy and confi-
dentiality that was made when the data were collected. The
archivist also accepts the responsibility to promote the advance-
ment of science by sharing data that are as useful as possible,
thereby ensuring that secondary data users, and the larger
scientific community, have the greatest possibility to use the
data. By definition, the archivist lives with the choices that the
data producer has made about what data to collect, how they
were collected, what information was revealed to the public
during the time of data collection, and what information the data
producer published before or after the transfer of data to the
archive.
The archivist also has the responsibility of thinking about the
long-term preservation of the data in the context of potential
future opportunities and risks that might emerge. Some disclo-
sure risks may diminish over time, e.g., population mobility
reduces the certainty that a spatial link to a residence reflects
where someone currently lives. Preserving some data that will be
released only after a period of embargo (not necessarily as long
as the U.S. Census Bureau’s 72 years) may ameliorate some
confidentiality problems but is no panacea. The timely second-
ary analysis of data is required for continued scientific advance-
ment. But the archivist also needs to consider disclosure threats
that might arise in the future as increasing amounts of data are
linked and linkages become easier to make.
Responsible data producers and data archives have long
included an examination and reduction of potential disclosure
risk in the procedures that they follow when making data
available to others and when accepting data into their collections
(8, 9). A substantial and growing literature exists about ways to
limit disclosure in tabular data with area identifiers but no
precise spatial locations (10–15). Data suppression, such that
data from areas with small numbers of observations are not
released, is one possible technique that preserves original data
for larger areas. Alternatively, data producers or archivists may
transform data while maintaining important characteristics of
the original data (16, 17) by changing records (e.g., swapping a
record from one spatial area with one from another area), by
As part of a restricted-use contract, Add Health releases relative household location within
primary sampling units, with no links to any other data. With these data, it is possible to
map the characteristics of respondents in Euclidean space (20). Adding layers to such a map
would increase not only its scientific value but also the security risk. Even without spatial
links, the relative household location can be compared with census-based maps of the
school-age population to narrow the list of possible sampling units. Extreme care must be
taken in the presentation of any visual display based on these data.
**The National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and many other
research funders require some or all of their grantees to share data. The National
Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation policies on data sharing may be
viewed at: http:grants2.nih.govgrantspolicydatasharing and www.nsf.govpubs
2001gc101gc101rev1.pdf (section 36).
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changing attributes (e.g., by recoding values so that extreme
values are combined with less extreme values), or more recently,
by creating data that are partly or completely synthetic.
The above-mentioned methods work for tabular data without
spatial locations of individual respondents because it is possible
to limit the possibility that someone enumerated in a survey or
administrative database can be uniquely identified as a single
individual in the population at large. More recently, geographers
have developed limited methods for adding noise or transform-
ing those locations to limit disclosure risk while preserving the
ability to analyze those data (18). These methods go beyond the
basic technique of aggregating over space to reduce the likeli-
hood of identifiable individuals and include adjusting geographic
coordinates by various means and attaching contextual variables
to the microdata so that secondary data users do not know the
exact location. However, these methods may not be as useful as
they could be and themselves carry dangers, e.g., they may allow
for sufficient inference to identify the location of a respondent
or sampling cluster. Geographers also have used a variety of
methods to convert point data or aggregated census data to
continuous surfaces to represent the distribution of population
characteristics without identifying individual respondents (19,
20). These surfaces provide an adequate representation of
distributions on single variables and can be combined for un-
derstanding correlations between variables. However, the dis-
semination of only such surfaces does not provide the microdata
on the individual characteristics and relative positions of indi-
viduals that are necessary for cutting-edge analyses of spatially
explicit census and survey data.
Until recently, virtually all shared social-science data were
made available for secondary analysis as public-use data files, in
which all known potential identifiers were removed or obscured.
These data could then be distributed widely to the research
community, who were able to share them without concern that
individual respondents could be identified. When spatial loca-
tions are linked to social science data, such public-use distribu-
tion systems become almost impossible to maintain. As men-
tioned, one solution to this dilemma is for data producers and
data archivers to limit access to their data, either by entering into
contractual agreements with potential data users (who agree to
restricted terms of data use) or by insisting that data users only
use the data in a restricted-use enclave facility. These solutions
still require improvements, perhaps by developing something
that approaches a true virtual enclave, in which restricted access
to data can take place, without requiring travel, access fees, or
delays before the results are available to the researcher. One goal
we advocate is a clearly delineated partnership of data produc-
ers, data archivists, and data users that is designed to ensure that
everyone acts together to share data that have been designed and
produced with an eye toward maximizing both primary and
secondary use.
Discussion and Conclusion
To summarize, many questions require linking microlevel survey
or census data with spatially explicit data that characterize the
social, economic, and biophysical context in which survey or
census respondents live, work, andor engage in leisure activi-
ties. Once the precise spatial locations of a person’s activities are
known, these locations serve as identifiers that can be used as
links to a vast array of spatial and social data. This linkage poses
challenges to issues of confidentiality, data sharing among
scientists, and archiving data for future scientific generations.
We have a moral responsibility to protect the confidentiality of
respondents, and if we shirk that responsibility, respondents will
not provide data on future censuses and surveys. Similarly, we
have a moral responsibility to advance the scientific agenda on
issues that could benefit from the sharing of data that link
respondents to their social and biophysical environments. Fur-
ther, the history of science provides many examples of new and
important uses of old data, which argues for the preservation of
data; but, as data are archived, how can investigators be assured
of the safeguarding of respondents’ confidentiality by future
researchers?
In this paper, we have indicated how the principles of confi-
dentiality protection, useful social–spatial linkages, data sharing,
and data preservation are currently in conflict. This situation is
not permanent but instead requires careful thought, research,
and debate. We do not have solutions but conclude by noting why
ignoring the problem is unacceptable, how consensus does not
yet exist on what level of risk of confidentiality breach is
acceptable or even how to estimate that risk, and how new
institutional arrangements for making linked data available need
to consider the burdens imposed on legitimate researchers.
Ignoring Is Unacceptable. At the front line of those who protect the
confidentiality of research subjects are the investigators who are
responsible for the collection of such information. In the past,
their traditional practice was either to strip away all personal
identifiers, such as names and addresses, before making data
available to the broader research community or to release
tabular data that had been aggregated to the point where no
information was provided about any individual. The aggregation
and tabular-release approach could be used with spatially linked
data, but doing so precludes the microlevel analyses necessary
for a large fraction of the most pressing research problems.
Stripping away the personal identifiers means stripping away the
spatial links, and, hence, removing locational identifiers. Either
approach, tabular or stripping, means that only a small number
of investigators will have access to the full power of the data and
is, therefore, unacceptable if the scientific community is going to
make progress in understanding a variety of microlevel social
and environmental processes.
Acceptable Risk Level. There is no consensus now about what level
of risk of confidentiality breach is acceptable given the research
benefits that might accrue if linked data were made available
outside the institution that collected the data. The example with
Add Health data used a 1-in-20 median risk level for disclosing
the primary sampling unit. Although this level was for illustra-
tion and disclosure of the primary sampling unit and not the
respondent, it is clear that a 1-in-20 disclosure risk of a respon-
dent’s identity is totally unacceptable. What would be accept-
able: 1 in 100? 1 in 1 million? Should the median risk level be our
guide, or should we discuss acceptable levels for the maximum
risk? If, instead of a 1-in-20 risk level for the median school, we
chose a 1-in-20 risk level for each and every school, the buffer
around schools to achieve this risk level would be 255.6 km, not
20.5 km. Does the level of acceptable risk depend on the type or
magnitude of societal benefit that would be gained by answers to
the research question? These questions need to be aired by all
actors who have a stake in the outcome (e.g., respondents,
data-collecting investigators, funders, secondary data research-
ers, institutional review boards, archivists, and journal editors).
Nor is there consensus on the disclosure risks associated with
various approaches that have already been tried. When spatial
explicitness is added to the tabular approach, disclosure risk
clearly increases, but basic research is just beginning to reveal the
size of this increase. A common current practice is to share the
linked data with other researchers only after these researchers
have agreed to a data security plan. Although there is not yet
published research on the safety of this approach, anecdotal
reports suggest that compliance with such security pledges can be
flawed. Even the use of enclaves, where the researcher’s activ-
ities are carefully monitored, carries unknown risks. Despite
these unknown risks, most who have worried about these issues
believe that, among current options, enclaves carry the lowest


















risk of confidentiality breaches. We turn now to our last point,
namely the relationship between the current manner in which
enclaves have been structured and the lives of researchers.
Enclaves and Researchers. A number of enclaves have now been set
up around the United States. Researchers conduct their research
at the enclave, and all of the output that they take from the
enclave is carefully monitored from the perspective of disclosure
risk. With few exceptions, enclaves are operated by federal
data-collection agencies or those responsible for large data
collections, i.e., the data producers set up these enclaves. Be-
cause they want to maintain control over the security of the
enclave, they tend to set them up at their own institution. The
U.S. Census Bureau is the main exception, and even here there
are a very small number of census enclaves.
There are equity concerns with the use of enclaves, because
some charge fees and users must travel to the facilities. More-
over, enclaves do not always work well for interdisciplinary
research teams. The team member with the technical skills
necessary to work in the enclave may not be able single-handedly
to incorporate the ideas of the full team. Numerous decisions are
made in the course of analysis that might be handled differently
if all team members could see all of the intermediate output. In
sum, the enclave is not an ideal data-dissemination approach.
We believe that the scientific community needs a broader
understanding of the potential confidentiality breach problems
that are part of linking census or survey data to spatially explicit
data. We need research on the risks associated with various
protection schemes and with the display of linked data in
publications and the like. It will be necessary to quantify the
known and, to the extent possible, unknown risks. Simulated
microdata provide a promising avenue for evaluating risk with-
out risking disclosure of survey respondents. Although that
exercise is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an obvious next
step in which the research community should collectively invest.
Once we further understand the problem, we need to forge
solutions that both protect respondents and make critical data
available to relevant members of the research community. In the
current research milieu, explicit future funding opportunities for
evaluating these risks and developing new methods to overcome
these risks could be an important catalyst for finding acceptable
solutions. These opportunities should be designed to incorporate
the many stakeholders and perspectives that we have laid out
here.
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